二、 指定用書(Text Books)
You should have read the entirety of Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons (1990)
by the third week of the semester; and Amy Poteete, Marco Janssen, and Elinor
Ostrom, Working Together (2010) should be read in its entirety by the last week
of the semester.
三、 參考書籍(References)
Papers from the International Journal of Commons,
教學方式(Teaching Method)
The course will offer an introductory lecture followed by weekly two hour
seminars. These seminars will utilise a mix of teaching methods involving a
workshop format, small group work, presentations and case study analysis. Each
seminar will be led by a student presentation. There are no pre-requisites for
this course.
四、 教學進度(Syllabus)
Week 1: Background
1. McGinnis and Walker (2010), “Foundations of the Ostrom Workshop:
institutional analysis, polycentricity,
and self-governance,” Public Choice 143: 293-301.
2. Elinor Ostrom, Selections from Fall 2011 Syllabus for Political Science Y673.
3. Elinor Ostrom (2010), “A Long Polycentric Journey,” Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci.
13: 1-23.
4. McGinnis and E. Ostrom (2012), “Reflections on Vincent Ostrom, Public
Administration, and Polycentricity,”
PAR 12(1): 15-25.
5. Michael D. McGinnis (2011). “Elinor Ostrom: Politics as Problem-Solving in
Polycentric Settings,” in Donatella
Campus, Gianfranco Pasquino, and Martin Bull, eds., Maestri of Political
Science, volume 2, Colchester,
UK: ECPR Press, pp. 137-158.
6. Singer (2015), “The Indian States of America: Parallel Universes &
Overlapping Sovereignty,” Amer. Indian L.
Rev. 38: 1-33.
Week 2: Social ontology: of things and institutions
1. Searle (1998), “Social Ontology and the Philosophy of Society,”
Analyse&Kritik S.143-158.
2. Denzau& North (1994), “Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions,”
Kyklos47: 3-31.
3. V. Ostrom (1980), “Artisanship and Artifact,” PAR 40: 309-317.
4. Searle (2005), “What is an institution?” J. Inst. Econ. 1: 1-22.
5. North (1994), “Economic Performance through Time,” Amer. Econ. Rev. 84: 359-
368.
6. Coase (1992), “The Industrial Structure of Production,” Amer. Econ. Rev. 82:
713-719.
7. Crawford and E. Ostrom, “A Grammar of Institutions,” Amer. Poli. Sci. Rev.
89: 582-600.
8. E. Ostrom (1986), “An Agenda for the Study of Institutions,” Public Choice
48: 3-25.
Week 3: Governance institutions: law and/or social norms
1. Pound (1940-41), “What is Law?” W. Va. L. Q. 47: 1-12.
2. Holmes (1896-97), “The Path of the Law,” Boston L. School Mag. 1: 1-17.
3. Llewellyn (1949), “Law and the Social Sciences,” Amer. Socio. Rev. 14:451-
462.
4. Milgrom, North, and Weingast (1990), “The Role of Institutions in the Revival
of Trade: The Law Merchant,
Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs,” Econ. And Pol. 2: 1-23.
5. Ellickson (1986), “Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution among Neighbors in
Shasta County,” Stanford L.
Rev. 38: 623-687.
6. R. Posner (1997), “Social Norms and the Law: An Economic Approach,” Amer.
Econ. Rev. 87: 365-369.
7. Jolls and Sunstein (2006), “Debiasing through Law,” J. Leg. Stud. 35: 199-
242.
Week 4: Commons dilemmas, rational actors, and collective action
1. Arrow (1986), “Rationality of Self and Others in an Economic System,” J. Bus.
59: S385-S399.
2. Simon (1972), “Theories of Bounded Rationality,” in C.B. McGuire and R.
Rander (eds) Decision and
Organization, Dordrecht: North-Holland.
3. Cave (1987) “Introduction to Game Theory” RAND Graduate School.
4. Edney and Harper (1978), “The Commons Dilemma: A Review of Contributions from
Psychology,”
Envt’l Mgt. 2: 491-507.
5. E. Ostrom (1988), “Institutional Arrangements and the Commons Dilemma,” in V.
Ostrom, Feeney, and Ficht
(eds), Rethinking Institutional Analysis and Development. SF: ICS Press,
pp. 103-139.
6. Cole & Grossman (2010), “Institutions matter! Why the Herder Problem is not a
Prisoner’s Dilemma,” Theory
and Decision 69: 219-231.
7. Nowak (2006), “Five rules for the evolution of cooperation,” Sci.
Week 5: “Design principles” for sustainable CPR governance
1. Dietz, E. Ostrom, and Stern (2003), “The struggle to govern the commons,”
Sci. 302: 1907-1912.
2. E. Ostrom et al. (1999), “Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global
Challenges,” Sci. 284: 278-82.
3. E. Ostrom, “Design Principles of Robust Property Rights Institutions: What
Have We Learned,” in Ingram and
Hong (eds), Property rights and land policies. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln
Institute.
4. Cox, Arnold, and Villamayor Tomas (2010), “A Review of Design Principles for
Community-based Natural
Resource Management,” Ecol. & Soc. 15: 38-__.
5. Gutierrez, Hillborn&Defeo (2011), “Leadership, social capital and incentives
promote successful fisheries,”
Nature 470: 386-389.
6. Agrawal (2003), “Sustainable Governance of Common-Pool Resources: Context,
Methods, and Politics,” Ann.
Rev. Anthro. 32: 243-262.
Week 6: Property and resource governance
1. V. Ostrom & E. Ostrom (1977), “Public Goods and Private Choices,” in McGinnis
(ed), Polycentricity and local
public economies. Readings from the workshop in political theory and
policy analysis. Ed. Michael
McGinnis, Ann Arbor.-University of Michigan Press, 1999.
2. Hardin (1968), “The Tragedy of the Commons,” Sci. 162: 1243-1248.
3. E. Ostrom, “How Types of Goods and Property Rights Jointly Affect Collective
Action,” J. Theo. Pol. 15: 239-
270.
4. Schlager&Ostrom (1992), “Property-Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A
Conceptual Analysis,” Land
Econ. 68: 249-262.
5. Clark (1973), “Profit Maximization and the Extinction of Animal Species,” J.
Pol. Econ. 81: 950-961.
6. Cole (2015), “’Economic property rights’ as ‘nonsense upon stilts’: a comment
on Hodgson,” J. Inst. Econ.
June 1-6.
7. Cole & E. Ostrom (2011), “The Variety of Property Systems and Rights in
Natural Resources,” in Cole &
Ostrom (eds), Property in Land and Other Resources. Cambridge, MA:
Lincoln Institute, pp. 37-64.
Week 7: Analytical frameworks 1: IAD
1. V. Ostrom & E. Ostrom (2004), “The Quest for Meaning in Public Choice,” Amer.
J. Econ. & Soc. 63: 105-147.
2. E. Ostrom (1986), “A Method of Institutional Analysis,” in Kaufmann et al.
(eds), Guidance, Control, and
Evaluation in the Public Sector. Berlin: de Gruyter, pp. 459-475.
3. E. Ostrom (2011), “Background on the Institutional Analysis and Development
framework,” PSJ 39: 7-27.
4. McGinnis (2011), “An Introduction to IAD and the Language of the Ostrom
Workshop: A Simple Guide to a
Complex framework,” PSJ 39: 169-183.
5. McGinnis (2012), “How to Use the IAD framework” (mimeo).
6. McGinnis (2011), “Networks of Adjacent Action Situations in Polycentric
Governance,” PSJ 39: 51-78.
7. Cole (forthcoming), “Formal Institutions and the IAD framework: Bringing
the Law Back In”
Week 8: Analytical frameworks 2: SES
1. Anderies, Janssen, and E. Ostrom (2004), “A framework to Analyze the
Robustness of Social-ecological
Systems from an Institutional Perspective,” Ecol. & Soc. 9: 18- .
2. E. Ostrom (2007), “A diagnostic approach for going beyond panaceas,” PNAS
104: 15181-15187.
3. E. Ostrom (2009), “A General framework for Analyzing Sustainability of
Social-Ecological Systems,” Sci. 325:
419-422.
4. Cox and E. Ostrom (2010), “Moving beyond panaceas: a multi-tiered diagnostic
approach for social-
ecological analysis,” Envt’lConserv. 37: 451-463.
5. McGinnis & E. Ostrom (2014), “Social-ecological system framework: initial
changes and continuing
challenges,” Ecol. & Soc. 19: 30- .
6. Epstein et al. (2013), “Missing ecology: Integrating ecological perspectives
with the social-ecological system
framework,” Int’l J. Commons 7: 432-453.
7. Cole, Epstein & McGinnis (2014), “Digging deeper into Hardin’s pasture: the
complex institutional structure
of ‘the tragedy of the commons’,” J. Inst. Econ. Mar. 2014: 1-17.
Week 9: Your research topics or proposals
Week 10: Polycentricity and metropolitan governance
1. Geller (2004), “Tocquevillian Analytics,” conference paper from WOW3.
2. V. Ostrom, Tiebout, & Warren (1961), “The Organization of Government in
Metropolitan Areas: A
Theoretical Inquiry,” Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev. 55: 831-842.
3. E. Ostrom (1996), “Governance of Local Communities” (unpublished
manuscript)
4. Boettke, Palagashvili, and Lemke (2013), “Riding in cars with boys:
ElinorOstrom’s adventures with the
police,” J. Inst. Econ. 9: 407-425.
5. E. Ostrom (1974), “Ventures in Teaching and Learning,” A & S The Review 10-17
6. Feiock (2009), “Metropolitan Governance and Institutional Collective Action,”
Urban Affairs Rev. 44: 356-
377.
7. Aligica and Tarko, “Polycentricity: From Polanyi to Ostrom, and Beyond,”
Governance 25: 237-262.
Week 11: Polycentricity beyond metropolitan governance
1. Hooghe and Marks (2003), “Unraveling the Central State, but How? Types of
Multi-level Governance,”
Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev. 97: 233-243.
2. V. Ostrom (1973), “Can Federalism Make a Difference?” Publius 3: 197-237.
3. V. Ostrom (1969), “Operational Federalism: Organization for the Provision of
Public Services in the American
Federal System,” Public Choice 6: 1-17.
4. E. Ostrom (2010), “Polycentric systems for coping with collective action and
global environmental change,”
Global Envt’l Change 20: 550-557.
5. Cole (2015), “Advantages of a polycentric approach to climate change policy,”
Nature Climate Change 5:
114-118.
6. Andersson and E. Ostrom (2008), “Analyzing decentralized resource regimes
from a polycentric perspective,”
Policy Sci. 41: 71-93.
Week 12: The Ostroms and public choice
1. Mitchell (1988), “Virginia, Rochester, and Bloomington: Twenty-Five Years of
Public Choice and Political
Science,” Public Choice 56: 101-119.
2. Boettke and Marciano (2014), “The past, present, and future of Virginia
Political Economy,” Public Choice
163: 53-65.
3. V. Ostrom & E. Ostrom (1971), “Public Choice: A Different Approach to the
Study of Public Administration,”
PAR 31: 203-216.
4. E. Ostrom (1998), “A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of
Collective Action,” Amer. Pol. Sci.
Rev. 92: 1-22.
5. V. Ostrom (1975), “Alternative Approaches to the Organization of Public
Proprietary Interests,” Nat. Res. J.
15: 765-789.
6. V. Ostrom (2011), “Executive Leadership, Authority Relationships, and Public
Entrepreneurship,” in B. Allen
(ed.), Vincent Ostrom,The Quest to Understand Human Affairs: Natural Resources
Policy and Essays on
Community and Collective Choice, vol. 1. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, pp. 443-
449.
Week 13: Development dilemmas
1. Radelet (2006), “A Primer on Foreign Aid,” Center for Global Development
Working Paper 92.
2. Alesina and Dollar (2000), “Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?” J. Econ.
Growth 5: 33-63.
3. Easterly (2003), “Can Foreign Aid Buy Growth?” J. Econ. Pers. 17: 23-48.
4. E. Ostrom, Schroeder and Wynne (1993), “Analyzing the Performance of
Alternative Institutional
Arrangements for Sustaining Rural Infrastructure in Developing
Countries,” J. Pub. Admin. Res. & Theory 3:
11-45.
5. Araral (2005), “Bureaucratic incentives, path dependence, and foreign aid: An
empirical institutional analysis
of irrigation in the Phillipines,” Policy Sci. 38: 131-157.
6. Ramalingam and Jones (2008), “Exploring the science of complexity: Ideas and
implications for development
and humanitarian efforts,” Overseas Development Institute Working Paper
295.
7. Sawyer (2005), “What African Analysts can learn from the Ostroms,” J. Econ.
Behavior & Org. 57: 237-240.
8. Leeson (2005), “Self-enforcing arrangements in African political economy,” J.
Econ. Behavior & Org. 57: 241-
244.
Week 14: Applying Workshop frameworks and methods to artifactualcommonses
1. Madison, Frischmann, and Strandberg (2010), “Constructing Commons in the
Cultural Environment,” Cornell
L. Rev. 95: 657-709.
2. E. Ostrom (2010), “Response: The Institutional Analysis and Development
framework and the Commons,”
Cornell L. Rev. 95: 807-815.
3. Frischmann (2005), “An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons
Management,” Minnesota L. Rev.
89: 918-1030.
4. Kunneke, Groenewegen, and Menard (2010), “Aligning modes of organization with
technology: Critical
transactions in the reform of infrastrutures,” J. Econ. Behavior & Org.
75: 494-505.
5. Hiatt (1975), “Protecting the Medical Commons: Who Is Responsible?” N.E. J.
Med. 293: 235-241.
6. McGinnis (2013), “Caring for the Health Commons: What It is and Who’s
Responsible for It?” Ostrom
Workshop Working Paper W13-5.
Week 15: Legacies and persisting challenges
1. Liu et al. (2007), “Complexity of Coupled Human and Natural Systems,” Sci.
317: 1513-1516.
2. E. Ostrom (2012), “Coevolving Relationships between Political Science and
Economics,” RMM 3: 51-65.
3. E. Ostrom (2007), “Challenges and growth: the development of the
interdisciplinary field of institutional
analysis,” J. Inst. Econ. 3: 239-264.
4. Poteete and E. Ostrom (2003), “In Pursuit of Comparable Concepts and Data
about Collective Action,” CAPRi
Working Paper No. 29.
5. Cole, Epstein, and McGinnis (forthcoming). “Toward a New Institutional
Analysis of Social-Ecological
Systems: Combining the IAD and SES frameworks”
6. Frischmann (2013), “Two enduring lessons from Elinor Ostrom,” J. Inst. Econ.
9: 387-406.
ONLY three "EXCELLENT" groups will be selected.
W16: group study report-I
W17: group study report-II
W18: group study report-III
五、 成績考核(Evaluation)
75% of the final course mark will derive from a 3,500 word assessed essay. The
remaining marks will be derived from presentation (15%) and
participation/attendance (10%).
六、 可連結之網頁位址